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1. Introduction  
 
Global problems such as poverty, migration and climate change require interdisciplinary inquiry 
and solutions. In recognition of this need, interdisciplinary approaches are beginning to be 
privileged in research funding policies and decisions, and in pedagogies favouring problem-based 
and experiential learning. It is timely, then, to focus attention, as this paper does, on the reasoning 
involved in interdisciplinary inquiry and on what can be done to facilitate and nurture successful 
interdisciplinary inquiry. 
  As the author describes it, interdisciplinary inquiry will usually involve the integration of 
information from a, possibly diverse, range of disciplines to generate alternative explanations 
followed by the determination of which of those explanations is the best one. Thus, a principal 
reasoning move in interdisciplinary inquiry is inference to the best explanation. Making those 
inferences presents a particular challenge given that each disciplinary inquirer will bring a different 
perspective to the inquiry, contribute different types of data gathered via different means and 
measured and evaluated according to different scales and standards. The author draws on her own 
involvement in interdisciplinary projects to provide two case studies of interdisciplinary inquiry 
in action. The paper is very relevant given the extent to which real-world inquiry needs to be 
interdisciplinary, and I found it interesting and thought-provoking. In the main, my comments are 
intended to suggest elements of the paper that seem ripe for further expansion or give rise to further 
questions for reflection and investigation. 
 
2. Not just the best explanation 
 
The author identifies inferences to the best explanation (hereafter IBE) as the main reasoning task 
of interdisciplinary inquiry. Yet, as she notes in her discussion of her second case study, the 
assumption that any one of the explanations proffered from the perspective of a diverse group of 
disciplines could be the best of the bunch is unhelpful to the inquiry for it drives us back to a mono-
disciplinary approach. Instead, her own approach was to integrate the various explanatory 
narratives into a single narrative that offered a holistic explanation of the rigid division of 
information and collaboration between forestry and agriculture experts. This example 
demonstrates how it is possible to come to an explanation that enables us better to understand the 
problem at hand. However, once we have gained an understanding of a problem, our inquiry, 
including, perhaps, especially, interdisciplinary inquiry, also aims to offer solutions to that 
problem. Take for example the practice of making a medical diagnosis and then arriving at a 
treatment decision. The reasoning involved in coming to diagnoses consists primarily of IBE 
drawn from a variety of data including the patient’s symptoms, various tests such as blood tests, 
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ultrasound scans, CAT scans, cardiograms, and so on. Just this wide variety of tests and their 
related measures and standards demonstrates the way in which medical diagnoses are often 
interdisciplinary inquiries. Arriving at a correct diagnosis of a patient’s condition will often require 
the input of more than one physician in order to conclude which interventions will offer the best 
approach to curing or managing the patient’s condition. In the case of a cancer diagnosis, for 
example, the inquiry and resultant solution may well involve (at least) a surgeon, a radiologist and 
an oncologist working in concert to offer a complete treatment plan. In the medicine case the 
members of the community of inquiry first bring relevant concepts, methods, measures and 
standards to bear to reach an explanation of the patient’s symptoms that weaves the strands of their 
individual explanations into a single account or story of what’s going on with the patient. On the 
basis of that interdisciplinary account, they move forward to find an interdisciplinary solution that 
enables them each to bring to bear their expertise in the best interests of the patient. While there 
are no doubt moments of disagreement and contest in communities of inquiry in the medical 
profession, they do, it seems to me, offer a potentially rich source of both case studies and sites for 
further investigation and reflection on interdisciplinary inquiry and problem-solving. Moreover, 
these communities of inquiry may well employ inquiry tools that could be deployed more widely 
in interdisciplinary inquiry. 
  The medicine example also illustrates the way in which successful interdisciplinary inquiry 
and problem solving brings together partial explanations into a productive whole. Each inquirer in 
the community views the problem at hand through a lens particular to their discipline. Their lens 
enables them to pick out features of the situation that are salient from within the conceptual and 
methodological framework of that discipline. They interpret data, make measurements and apply 
standards all from within that framework. Thus each individual’s inquiry, as the author notes, is 
partial. It is partial in two respects. It is not impartial, it comes from within a particular framework 
and an inquirer will feel naturally inclined towards, at home within, the narrative generated from 
within the horizons of her own disciplinary outlook. But it is also partial in the sense that it tells 
us only part of the complete story about what’s going on in the case at hand. By bringing together 
each of these partial stories and creating a closer-to-complete story, we arrive at a better 
explanation than we are likely to have had we confronted the problem at hand from a single 
disciplinary perspective.   
  In discussing her own solution to the problem of combining diverse explanatory narratives 
to generate a single, more complete, explanation, the author mentions (i) storytelling as a form of 
argument and (ii) a ‘story with an argument.’ It wasn’t clear to me whether she was distinguishing 
these, but nevertheless, the questions of the relation between narrative and argument and the role 
that narrative might play in argument within an interdisciplinary (indeed, any) community of 
inquiry are intriguing ones that invite further reflection, discussion and investigation.  
 
3. Bias 
 
The author notes that the risk of bias is bigger in interdisciplinary contexts. She provides a 
discussion of various biases that can occur in the context of interdisciplinary inquiry – biased 
choices of which process(s) to test, biased choices of which process counts as the best explanation 
– as well as familiar cognitive biases such as convenience bias and confirmation bias. I wondered 
whether, when biased reasoning occurs, it tends to manifest as bias in favour of the meanings, 
measures and standards of one’s own discipline. On the face of it, in the case of confirmation bias, 
that seems likely since, faced with reasoning through an array of methodological choices, inquirers 
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are more likely to err on the side of the expected rather than the unexpected and an inquirer’s 
expectations will be embedded in her discipline.  In the case of convenience bias, however, it 
seems less likely (though not necessarily unlikely) that an inquirer will err towards her own 
discipline if the explanation offered by another discipline presents an easier choice, or, as the 
author describes, she is simply facing investigation-fatigue. While the danger of bias is clear and 
present, it may be that bias is easier to detect and deal with in disciplinarily-diverse communities 
of inquiry.  When an inquiry is interdisciplinary, differences in the concepts, methodologies, 
measures and standards of each discipline are more likely to be thrown into relief and to be fore-
grounded and negotiated than they are in the case of single disciplinary inquiries in which we can 
remain blinkered to the frameworks in which we are operating. So while bias remains a danger, I 
suggest the fact that within interdisciplinary inquiry the conceptual and methodological markers 
of each discipline are on the surface means that it becomes easier to identify and negotiate bias.  
 
4. Bridging the communication-reasoning gap 
 
My penultimate points concern what the author describes as a gap between reasoning and 
communication, together with her claim that group discussion can mitigate biases. I suggest that a 
virtues-oriented approach to good inquiry may offer a productive means to bridging that gap. A 
virtues oriented approach to inquiry takes an agent-centred turn, making what constitutes good 
inquiry a matter, or partly a matter, of whether inquirers manifest certain characteristics.1  These 
virtues include reliabilist virtues such as perceptual abilities, observational skills and the ability to 
reason deductively and inductively; and responsibilist virtues such as open-mindedness, fairness, 
epistemic humility, perseverance, the ability to recognise reliable authority, intellectual courage 
and autonomy.2 A number of the responsibilist virtues are particularly relevant to the types of 
group inquiry that occur in the context of interdisciplinary communities of practice. Striving to be 
open-minded can help inquirers to remain open to explanations they had not previously thought of 
even when they are at odds with explanations generated with their own discipline. By remaining 
open to possibilities other than those to which she is already committed, the open-minded inquirer 
can thus be less prone to bias in favour of her own discipline. The inquirer who strives to be 
epistemically humble will avoid assuming that her own discipline is in some way superior to those 
of other enquirers and be open to learning from and working alongside, or within, those other 
disciplines. The inquirer who is diligent and prepared to persevere in her inquiries is less likely to 
fall prey to convenience bias. The inquirer who possesses and displays intellectual courage will be 
well placed to negotiate value choices and to take on board better explanations from disciplines 
other than her own even when it means putting her own explanations to one side. While I have 
only provided a brief sketch of the role that a virtues-oriented approach to good inquiry might play 
in thinking further about effective interdisciplinary inquiry, it is, I think, sufficient to demonstrate 
that there is rich potential in this approach with respect to confronting both the reasoning and 
communication challenges in interdisciplinary inquiry. For it is an approach, an advantage of 
which is that it enables us to focus and reflect upon relations between inquirers qua inquirers.  
 
 
                                                 
1 The list of responsibilist virtues is drawn from (Zagzebski p. 114) 
2 For examples of the virtue-theoretic approach to argument see, (Aberdein 2010, 2014); (Battaly 2010); (Paglieri 
2014). For an example of an approach that see a role for virtue in accounts of good reasoning but not as constitutive 
of good argument see (Bowell & Kingsbury 2013); 2105). 
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5. Conclusion  
 
Interdisciplinary work takes place not only at the intersections of disciplines, but also in the 
interstices, in the often as yet unnamed spaces between disciplines, from which new sites of inquiry 
and research questions arise. This sets us further challenges beyond understanding and negotiating 
the interplay of diverse interdisciplinary voices. It requires us to inquire into newly created 
disciplinary spaces requiring the negotiation of their own concepts, methods, measures and 
standards.  
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